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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DOYCE ALLEN,
Case No. 920197
Petitioner,
v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE
FINANCING,

Category No. 15

Respondent.
Brief in Opposition to
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the Supreme Court of Utah
LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
(See caption.)
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether, despite the lack of a requirement in federal or state
law, the Utah Medicaid program should be forced to adopt "resource
spend down."
REFERENCE TO THE OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS
OF ANY OPINION ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
Allen v. Utah Dept. of Health. 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah
App. 1992).
Allen v. Utah Dept. of Health, Case No. 910287-CA (Utah Ct.
App. filed Mar. 17, 1992).

JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari seeks review of a
decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 17, 1992. Review is
authorized by Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-4 (1992) and the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, Rule 45.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS
Utah Administrative Code R810-304-411.1 (1991):
Allow the following exemptions for medical assistance cases
other than Indigent Medical cases. . . .
1. One Home and Lot - All Cases
Exclude one home, including a mobile home, and lot owned or
being purchased and occupied the client.
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 46(d):
Rule 46. Considerations governing review of certiorari.
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right,
but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only for
special and important reasons. The following, while
neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme
Court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons
that will be considered:
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important
question of municipal, state, or federal law which has
not been, but should be, settled by the Supreme Court.
42 U.S.C.S.
(Appendix).

§

1396A(A)(34)

(Law.

Co-op.

1985).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case. Allen sought reversal of the "Final

Agency Action and Order on Review,M finding Petitioner Doyce Allen
- 2 -

(Allen) ineligible for Medicaid benefits based on his assets of
$10,745.90, which exceed the asset limit of $3,000.00. R. 94-106.
B.

Course of the Proceedings. The Court of Appeals affirmed

the agency decision. Allen v. Utah Deot. of Health, 182 Utah Adv.
Rep. 39 (Utah App. 1992).
C.

Relevant Facts.

Allen's resources at the time of

application were $10,745.90 and the resource limit was $3,000.00.
R. 113; Allen at 39.
$7,000.00.

The 1981 travel trailer was valued at

R. 98; Allen at 2.1

DHCF agrees with all other facts

as presented in the Petition.
ARGUMENT
NO SPECIAL OR IMPORTANT QUESTION OF FEDERAL LAW IS
PRESENTED TO JUSTIFY REVIEW OF THE CONCLUSION OF THE UTAH
COURT OF APPEALS THAT NEITHER FEDERAL MEDICAID LAW NOR
STATE LAW MANDATES A "RESOURCE SPEND DOWN" RULE.
Rule 46(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure sets forth
the only plausible standard for the granting of Allen's Petition
for Writ of Certiorari.

This exercise of judicial discretion is

1

In his petition, Allen asserts, "Allen's liquid assets put
him $129.00 over the limitf not counting his vehicles which were
arguably exempt." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11. The Court
of Appeals found it unnecessary to reach the issue of the
exemption, since the bank account alone put Allen over the limit.
Allen, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 at 40 n.4 (Utah App. 1992). The
exemption could only be upheld if found to be a medical necessity,
since it is outfitted with oxygen tanks. Allen claims it is used
for transportation, but it is really a second home in a warmer
climate, and Medicaid regulations are very clear that only one home
may be exempted. Utah Admin Code R810-304-411.1 (1991).
- 3 -

reserved for those cases where a special and important reason is
presented. In this case, no such question exists, because the Utah
Court of Appeals' decision is in harmony with prevailing law
throughout the country.
The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that federal law does
not mandate

a

"resource

eligibility.

Allen v. Utah Dept. of Health, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 39

at 40 (Utah App. 1992).

spend down" in determining

Medicaid

In reaching this conclusion, the majority

panel examined the legislative history accompanying

42 U.S.C.

§1396a(a) (17) as revealed in S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess., reprinted

in 1965 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1943, and

found that it points only to "income spend down" as being mandatory
under federal law.

Allen at 40 n.10.

After analyzing case law

from throughout the country, the Court of Appeals stated:

"Courts

conclude that federal Medicaid regulations permit, but do not
require, states to employ "resource spend down." Id. at 40 n.ll.
In his Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Allen claims that
"resource spend down" is required by the federal statutory scheme
for a determination of eligibility to be reasonable, and that the
Court of Appeals erred in failing to so find. However, Allen fails
to point

to any explicit

statute.

Rather, Allen requested the Court of Appeals to infer

Congressional intent.

supportive language in any federal

The Court of Appeals properly declined,
- 4 -

having found that the legislative history did not support Allen's
position.

Id. at 40. In response to the reasonableness question,

the Utah Court of Appeals stated:
We, unlike our colleague in dissent, cannot say it was
unreasonable for the DHCF to choose not to adopt
"resource spend down" in an otherwise completely optional
state benefit plan.
The express [state] legislative
concern is for economy and efficiency in implementing a
Medicaid program, and we cannot see how this line-drawing
offends the legislative delegation of power.
Id. at 41. It is also worth noting that Utah operates its Medicaid
program, without a "resource spend down" policy, pursuant to a
State plan that is approved on a yearly basis by the Federal Health
Care Financing Administration.
In Harriman v. Commissioner, 595 A.2d 1053 (Me. 1991), the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine found no federal or state law
requiring the use of a "resource spend down" rule in determining
eligibility for Medicaid in Maine.

Id. at 1055 n.2.

In Haley v.

Commissioner of Public Welfare, 394 Mass. 466, 476 N.E.2d 572
(1985),

the

Supreme

Judicial

Court

of Massachusetts

closely

examined both federal and its own state Medicaid laws and concluded
that "resource spend down" was not mandated by federal law. Haley,
476 N.E.2d at 578.

In Hession v. Illinois Department of Public

Aid, 129 111. 2d 535, 544 N.E.2d 751 (1989), the Illinois court
likewise held that federal Medicaid statutes permit, but do not
require, "resource spend down."

Hession, 544 N.E.2d at 757.

- 5 -

In the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Allen acknowledges
that Utah has never adopted the "resource spend down" option by
statute or agency rule.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8.

After finding that "resource spend down" is only mandated when
state law requires it, the Utah Court of Appeals stated:
Utah does not have such a saving "resource spend down"
provision in its Medicaid plan, nor any statement of
policy expressing a desire to preserve the resources of
potential beneficiaries. Utah's statutes, particularly
those outlining the DHCF's authority, seem to evince a
legislative concern for economy and efficiency in the
Medicaid program, not the preservation of applicants'
assets. Jurisdictions requiring "resource spend down."
on the contrary, appear concerned about preserving the
limited assets of Medicaid applicants.
Allen, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41 (footnotes omitted).
The Utah Court of Appeals then correctly noted

that "a

determination of the eligibility criteria for Medicaid benefits is
not one for the courts to make."

Id. at 42 n.18.

Any other

finding would violate the well-established doctrine of separation
of powers. While addressing precisely the same issue, the court in
Bemowski v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 136 Pa. Commw. 103, 582
A.2d 103, 106 (1990), said, "such a change in the eligibility
criteria for MA benefits by persons in the medically needy category
must be made legislatively or by regulation, not judicially."
Thus, the doctrine of separation of powers bars the courts
from mandating an increase in the allocation of monies to respond
to the expanding numbers of eligible individuals occasioned by such
- 6 -

a ruling changing eligiblity criteria. Since more people would be
eligible for benefits if an applicant could spend down resources
after application and still acquire Medicaid eligibility as of the
date of filing, either the extent of seirvices to all Medicaid
recipients would have to be reduced or the legislature would have
to appropriate a larger portion of the state budget to Medicaid to
maintain services to recipients at present levels,
CONCLUSION
The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be denied based
upon the lack of any special or important question of federal or
state law that justifies review of the decision of the Utah Court
of Appeals decision in this case,
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

'S ^day of May, 1992.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL

c

/

Douglas W. Sprin4meye
Assistant Attorney Ge,
Human Services Division
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Allen v. Utah Department
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182 Utah Adv. Rep. 39
Cite as

182 Utah Adv. Rep. 39
IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Doyce ALLEN,
Petitioner,
v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
Division of Health Care Financing,
Respondent.
No. 910287-CA
FILED: March 17, 1992
Original Proceeding in this Court
ATTORNEYS:
Steven Elmo Averett, Provo, for Petitioner
R. Paul Van Dam and J. Steven Mikita, Salt
Lake City, for Respondent

29, 1991, the DHCF issued a Final Agency
Action and Order on Review, adopting the
findings and conclusions of the hearing
officer. Allen then filed a Request for Reconsideration which was denied.
On appeal, Allen alleges the DHCF erred in
denying his Medicaid application because: (1)
The savings account funds are designated for
burial expenses and, thus, exempt from consideration for Medicaid eligibility; (2) the travel
trailer, modified to accommodate his wife's
disabilities, is a medical necessity or personal
effect and, thus, exempt from consideration
for Medicaid eligibility; and (3) he should have
been permitted to "spend down" his assets, by
applying them to medical bills, in order to
become eligible for Medicaid.

I. THE SAVINGS ACCOUNT AS A
BURIAL FUND
Allen contends that his $3,029.86 savings
account should not be included for purposes
of Medicaid eligibility because it is exempt as
a burial fund.1 In support of this claim, Allen
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Russon.
points to a statement in his will directing that
the savings account be used "to bury Doyce
This opinion is subject to revision before
Allen and Lilly Allen." Allen alleges the will is
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
properly before this court on appeal because it
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
was submitted to the DHCF with his Request
Petitioner Doyce Allen (Allen) appeals from for Reconsideration. The DHCF responds that
a final order of respondent Utah Department it is inappropriate for us to consider Allen's
of Health, Division of Health Care Financing will as part of the record on review because it
(DHCF) denying him Medicaid benefits. We was never introduced as evidence at Allen's
formal administrative hearing.
affirm.
A review of the record reveals that a copy
FACTS
of Allen's will was first presented to the
On January 23, 1991, Allen suffered a heart DHCF as an attachment to a letter from
attack while in Arizona. He was subsequently Allen's counsel, dated June 3, 1991, requestransported to Utah where he underwent heart ting a transcript of Allen's administrative
bypass surgery, resulting in medical costs hearing. The DHCF did not receive the will
exceeding $40,000.00. At the time of his heart until June 10, 19912, after the hearing
attack, Allen had no health insurance and was officer's Recommended Decision, the
ineligible for Medicare assistance because he DHCF's Final Agency Action and Order on
was not sixty-five years old.
Review, and the DHCF's Response to Request
Allen applied for Medicaid benefits on for Reconsideration had already been signed
February 4, 1991, seeking retroactive coverage and dated. Because there is no indication that
to include medical bills incident to his heart Allen's will was ever included as evidence
surgery in January, 1991. Utah Medicaid before the DHCF, it is not properly a part of
guidelines require that Allen's assets be less Allen's record on appeal.
than $3,000.00, on the first of each calendar
However, even if we were to consider the
month, to qualify for medical assistance. In general language in Allen's will, the result
both January and February, Allen owned a would not be different. Allen clearly and
savings account in the amount of $3,029.86, a unequivocally testified the account was to pay
checking account in the amount of $100.00, a for insurance premiums, not burial expenses.
Lincoln automobile valued at approximately Allen did not specify the account as a burial
$600.00, a 1983 Ford pickup truck valued at fund on his original Medicaid application.
approximately $2,500.00, and a 1981 travel During his formal administrative hearings.
trailer valued at approximately $7,000.00.
Allen did not argue or present any evidence
On February 19, 1991, the Office of Family indicating his savings account was designated
Support denied Allen's Medicaid application, for burial expenses. In fact, when the hearing
finding his resources exceeded the $3,000.00 officer specifically asked if the savings account
limit. Allen requested a formal hearing, after might be a burial fund, Allen replied that "we
which a DHCF hearing officer sustained the earned it last summer for our insurance predenial on the ground that Allen's "'savings miums, and they didn't go through, so we had
account alone exceeded the limit * On An«*i ttiic m n n a u fVx«» « « » * ^«»<» ..*«... *>••!•* -—— v - -

40
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have to have a little bit of something in case-."3 Therefore, considering only the savings
account for purposes of affirming on appeal4,
Allen's savings account alone surpassed the
$3,000.00 Medicaid limit.

subchapter, (B) provide for taking
into account only such income and
resources as are ... available to the
applicant or recipient ... (C) provide
for reasonable evaluation of any
such income or resources, and (D)
n. MEDICAID "SPEND DOWN"
... provide for flexibility in the
application of such standards with
A. An Overview of the Medicaid Program
respect to income by taking into
Allen alternatively argues that he should
account ... the costs ... incurred for
have been permitted to spend his assets on
medical care or for any other type
medical bills in order to qualify for Medicaid.
of remedial care recognized under
We look to both federal and Utah Medicaid
State law.
regulations to resolve this question.
In 1965, Congress established the Medicaid 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(17) (1992)(emphasis
program as Title XIX of the Social Security added). Courts recognize section 17(D) as the
Act.5 Medicaid is a cooperative federal-state "income spend down rule," finding that state
program providing federal funds to assist plans must permit a Medicaid applicant to
individuals "whose income and resources are "spend down" or deplete excess income to
insufficient to meet the costs of necessary comply with a state's eligibility standards.9
medical services." 42 U.S.C. §13% (1992).
The question in the present case, however, is
States choosing to participate in this optional whether the federal Medicaid regulations also
program are reimbursed for a portion of their require states to allow an applicant to "spend
costs in providing medical treatment to needy down" excess resources in the same manner.
persons. See Atkins v. Rivera, All U.S. 154, Allen contends that the federal Medicaid
156-57, 106 S. Ct. 2456, 2458 (1986); Weber program requires states to implement
Memorial Care Ctr., Inc. v. Utah Dept. of "resource spend down" because it is necessary
Health, 751 P.2d 831, 832 (Utah App.), cert, to fulfill the purpose of the Medicaid program
denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).
and is reasonable. The DHCF responds that
Participating states must develop a plan that federal Medicaid regulations mandate "income
complies with all federal Medicaid regulations. spend down" but merely permit states to incSee 42 U.S.C. §1396; Atkins, All U.S. at orporate "resource spend down" within their
157, 106 S. Ct. at 2458; Weber Memorial, 751 plans at their discretion.
P.2d at 832. Each state must also select a
Courts considering the issue agree with the
single agency "to administer or to supervise DHCF, finding the express statutory mandate
the administration of the plan." 42 U.S.C. is limited to "income spend down."10 Courts
§1396a(a)(5) (1992). In determining eligibility conclude that federal Medicaid regulations
for its program, a state must provide benefits permit, but do not require, states to employ
to the "categorically needy"* but may provide "resource spend down."11 We agree and conbenefits to the "medically needy"7 at its disc- clude "resource spend down" is not mandated
retion.*
by federal law.
B. The Concept of "Spend Down" in Federal
Medicaid Statutes
When a "medically needy" applicant's
income or resources exceed the applicable
state's Medicaid eligibility limits, the "spend
down" rule may apply. Under this rule, the
applicant may be able to "spend down" excess
income or assets, by applying them to outstanding medical bills, to become eligible for
Medicaid.
In determining whether the federal Medicaid
program requires states to adopt the "spend
down" rule, courts have focused on the following portion of the Medicaid statutes:
(a) A State plan for medical assistance must
(17) ... include reasonable standards ... for determining eligibility
for and the extent of medical assistance under the plan which (A) are
consistent with the objectives of this

C. Utah's Medicaid Program
Since Utah may implement "resource spend
down" at its discretion, we must determine
whether the Utah Medicaid plan has, in fact,
adopted "resource spend down" in determining
Medicaid eligibility. Utah courts have never
addressed Medicaid "spend down" issues.
Utah chose to participate in the Medicaid
program with the adoption of the Medical
Assistance Act in 1981.12 Utah has complied
with federal requirements by creating a state
plan13, which has been approved by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and
designating the DHCF as the agency responsible for Medicaid administration.14 Utah's
statutes describe the DHCF's responsibilities,
in pertinent part, as follows:
[T]he division is responsible for the
effective and impartial administration of this chapter in an efficient,
economical manner. The division
shall establish, on a statewide basis,
a program to safeguard against

CODE*co
Provo, Uuh
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unnecessary or inappropriate use of
Medicaid services, excessive payments, and unnecessary or inappropriate hospital admissions or lengths
of stay.
Utah Code Ann. §26-18-2.3(1) (1989).
(2) The department shall develop
implementing policy in conformity
with this chapter, the requirements
of Title XIX, and applicable federal
regulations.
Utah Code Ann. §26-18-3 (Supp.
1991)(emphasis added).
The department may develop standards and administer policies relating to eligibility under the Medicaid program.
Utah Code Ann. §26-18-4(1) (1989).
Allen points to no Medicaid statute, regulation, or rule indicating that the Utah legislature has adopted "resource spend down" in
determining Medicaid eligibility. Rather, Allen
posits a more delicate argument which goes
beyond literal statutory language. Specifically,
Allen contends that Utah will not be following
the federal requirement to use "reasonable
standards" in determining Medicaid eligibility
unless it applies "resource spend down."
Furthermore, Allen observes that Utah's
Medicaid plan designates certain assets as
exempt in determining eligibility for the
"medically needy."15 Allen, thus, argues that
Utah has tacitly adopted a policy of allowing
"medically needy" Medicaid applicants to
maintain a level of income and resources for
the necessities of life while still qualifying for
Medicaid.
In support of these claims, Allen cites cases
from other jurisdictions which, he argues,
require "resource spend down" because, like
Utah, they exempt certain assets from Medicaid eligibility determination. We read these
cases differently. Courts in these jurisdictions
have found a state mandate for "resource
spend down" based on a specific legislative
directive within their Medicaid plans, not just
on the practice of allowing exemptions.
In Haley v. Commissioner of Public
Welfare, 394 Mass. 466, 476 N.E.2d 572
(1985), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts closely examined both federal and its
own state Medicaid laws to determine if
"resource spend down" was mandated or
simply permitted. The court, first, determined
that, although the federal statutes did not
require "resource spend down," it was a reasonable method of calculating resources and
"consistent with the goals of Title XIX." id.,
476 N.E.2d at 578. Therefore, the court concluded that it "must determine independently
whether the Legislature intended to require the
use of a resource spend down." Id. at 579.
The court found a statute "explicitly

appl[ying] a resource spend down," id. n.9, as
evidence of "the legislature's determination to
ensure an individual's retention of a certain
level of resources." Id. at 579. The court,
thus, held that the Massachusetts Medicaid
plan required "resource spend down."
The Supreme Court of Illinois performed an
analysis similar to that of the Haley court in
Hession v. Illinois Department of Public Aid,
129 111. 2d 535, 544 N.E.2d 751 (1989). After
concluding that the federal Medicaid statutes
permit, but do not require, "resource spend
down," the court turned its attention to the
Illinois Medicaid plan. The court recognized
that the plan included a provision whereby
$1,500 in assets is exempt from Medicaid eligibility determination. However, the court,
relying upon a specific Illinois statute, also
stated: "In establishing an assistance program
for these individuals, the legislature has noted
that it is of special importance that their incentives for continued independence be maintained and that their limited resources be preserved." Id., 544 N.E.2d at 757 (citing 111.
Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 23, par. 5-1). Based on
this clear manifestation of legislative intent,
the court held that the Illinois Medicaid plan
required "resource spend down."
Utah does not have such a saving, "resource
spend down" provision in its Medicaid plan,
nor any statement of policy expressing a desire
to preserve the resources of potential beneficiaries.16 Utah's statutes, particularly those
outlining the DHCF's authority17, seem to
evince a legislative concern for economy and
efficiency in the Medicaid program, not the
preservation of applicants' assets. Jurisdictions requiring "resource spend down," on the
contrary, appear concerned about preserving
the limited assets of Medicaid applicants.
We, unlike our colleague in dissent, cannot
say it was unreasonable for the DHCF to
choose not to adopt "resource spend down" in
an otherwise completely optional state benefit
plan. The expressed legislative concern is for
economy and efficiency in implementing a
Medicaid program, and we cannot see how
this line-drawing offends the legislative delegation of power.
Utah's statutory scheme is more similar to
that of Maine, recently reviewed in Harriman
v. Commissioner, 595 A.2d 1053 (Me. 1991).
In Harriman, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine recognized that its state plan does not
include "resource spend down." "If the assets
of applicants exceed the specified dollar limit,
they are ineligible for assistance under the
medically needy program, regardless of the
amount of their medical expenses." Id. at
1056. Noting that "[tjhe overall effect was to
restrict as much as possible the number of
eligible Medicaid recipients," the court stated:
"For whatever reason-whether to achieve
cost containment or to comDlv onlv with th*
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the legislature stopped short of enacting an 102 S Ct 2597(1982)*

Provo Um
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asset spend-down." Id. at 1057 (footnote
omitted).
We, therefore, conclude there is nothing m
the Utah Medicaid plan or its regulations that
requires the utilization of "resource spend
down."" Allen had $3,029.86 in his savings
account at the time he applied for Medicaid.
The DHCF, thus, correctly determined he was
ineligible for Medicaid benefits as Utah has
not adopted a "resource spend down" system.
Judith M. Billings, Associate Presiding
Judge
I CONCUR:
Leonard H. Russon, Judge
1. Under the Utah Administrative Code, "a $1,500
burial or funeral fund exemption for each eligible
household member" is permitted only if these funds
"are separately identified and not commingled with
other funds. They must be clearly designated so that
an outside observer can see that these funds are
specifically for the client's burial expense " Utah
Code Admin. P. R810-304-4ll(9)(e)(l) (1991)
2. Allen argues the will "was submitted at a time
when the record was still open," pointing out that
the letter to which the will was attached was mailed
on June 3, 1991. The letter, nevertheless, clearly
bears a "Received June 10,1991" stamp.
3. Allen testified that, after the DHCF demed
Medicaid benefits, Allen, in fact, did not maintain
the account as a burial fund. The following exchange occurred at the administrative hearing:
HEARING OFFICER. What did you do
with the $3,000 m February which you
pulled out of the savings account?
MR. ALLEN: Well, we paid bills that
was accrued dunng our heart attack deal
here, and transportation to and from.
HEARING OFFICER: So, that money
was spent on medical things?
MR. ALLEN: Bills again.
Contrary to his argument, Allen apparently
neither considered nor used the savings account as a
fund "separately identifiable" which was set aside
"specifically" for burial expenses.
4. Allen also argues that his travel trailer, equipped
with oxygen, and his truck, both used to transport
Allen and his wife to a warmer climate dunng
winter because of his wife's ill health, should be
excluded from Medicaid eligibility consideration
because they are exempt either as personal effects or
medical necessities. See Utah Code Admin. P. R810304-411(4), (5)(b) to (d) (1991). Furthermore, Allen
asserts that, because his wife requires the truck and
travel trailer for health reasons, neither vehicle is
"available" to him, as contemplated by federal statutory Medicaid requirements. See 42 U.S.C.
§1396a(aX17XB) (1992) We find it unnecessary to
reach these issues m view of our determination that
Allen's savings account alone exceeded the Medicaid
eligibility limit.
5. Pub. L. No. 89-97, as amended, 79 Stat. 343
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§1396, et seq. (1992)).
6. See 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(10)(A)(i).
7. See42U.S.C. §1396a(a)(10XAXu).
8. The Umted States Supreme Court explained this
distinction in Schweiker v fforan. 457 U.S. 569.

Congress has differentiated between the
categorically needy-a class of aged,
bund, disabled, or dependent persons
who have very little income--and
other persons with similar characteristics
who are self-supporting Members of
the former class are automatically entitled to Medicaid; members of the latter
class are not eligible unless a State elects
to provide benefits to the medically
needy and unless then* income, after
consideration of medical expenses, is
below state standards of eligibility
Jd., 457 U.S at 590,102 S Ct at 2609
9 See, e.g., Atkins, 477 U.S. at 158, 106 S. Ct a
2459 ("the spenddown mechanism of 42 U.S C
§1396a(aX17)" allows the medically needy to spen
down "the amount by which their income exceeds
the eligibility level); Foley v Coler, No 83-C
4736, 1986 WL 20891 ( N D 111 Oct 1, 1986X"4
U.S.C. §1396a(a)(17)(D) requires states to us
income spend-down"); Hamman v Commissionei
No 90-0046-B, 1990 WL 284515 (D. Me. Nov S
1990)(42 U . S C
§1396a(a)(17)(D) "specificall
requires the state to have an mcome spend-dow
rule"); Walter O. Boswell Memorial Hosp., Inc \
Yavapai County, 148 Ariz. 385, 714 P.2d 878, 88
(Ct. App. 1986)("Federal regulations implementin
[42 U S.C. §1396a(17)] expressly require deductio
of incurred medical bills from mcome for purpose
of determining eligibility."); Ramsey v Depamner
of Human Servs., 301 Ark. 285, 783 S.W 2d 361
363 (1990X"Under the 'medically needy' procedure
applicants are permitted to 'spend down' thei
excess mcome for medical expenses."), Haley t
Commissioner of Pub Welfare, 394 Maj>s. 466, 47
N.E.2d 572, 574 (1985)(42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(n
"provide[s] for application of the spend down pn
nciple to mcome eligibility determinations"); Kemp
son v. North Carolina Dept. of Human Rei
ources, 100 N C. App. 482, 397 S.E.2d 314, 31
(1990XThe "explicit reference to income [in 4
U.S.C. §1396a(aX17)(D)] has been interpreted b
the courts to mean that 'mcome spend-down' i
allowed by the statute."), afVd, 328 N C. 722, 40
S.E.2d 279 (1991)
10. Legislative history accompanying sectioi
1396a(aX17) points to only "mcome spend down" a
a mandatory federal requirement See S. Rep. No
404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., repnnted w 1965 U.S
Code Cong. & Admin. News 1943.
11. See, e.g., Foley, 1986 WL 20891 ("42 U.S.C
§1396a(a)(17)(D) requires states to use mcom
spend-down but is silent regarding resource spend
down ... Resource spend-down is thus permitted
but not required, by the Medicaid statute and reg
ulations"); Hamman, 1990 WL 284515 ("Th
federal statute specifically requires the state to hav
an mcome spend-down rule.... But there is n<
similar requirement in the federal statute for a res
ource. spend-down rule "); Hession v Illinois Dept
of Pub. Aid, 129 111. 2d 535, 544 N E.2d 751, 75
(1989X* Simply stated, we perceive nothing m sectioi
1396a(aX17) which precludes a State that particip
ates m the Medicaid program from using the reso
urce spend down methodology if it chooses to d<
so."), Hession v. Illinois Dept. of Pub Aid, 163 111
App. 3d 553, 516 N.E.2d 820, 823 (1987)("sectioi
1396a(a)(17) of the Act permits a state plan t<
utilize resource snend down in determining an aon
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Iicant's eligibility for medical assistance benefits"), 18. We agree with most courts which have consida/Fd, 129 111. 2d 535, 544 N.E.2d 751 (1989); Har- ered the issue and believe the adoption of "resource
nman v. Commissioner, 595 A.2d 1053, 1055 n.2 spend down" is good public policy. See e.g., Foley,
(Me. 1991)(court adopts prior holding of district 1986 WL 20891 (a state resource spend-down
court in this case that federal Medicaid statute "only provision furthers the general purpose of the Medipermits, and does not require, a state to use an asset caid program); Harnman, 1990 WL 284515
spend-down"); Bemowski v. Department of Pub. ("Clearly, if the goal of Medicaid is to assist indivWelfare, 136 Pa. Commw. 103, 582 A.2d 103, 106 iduals who are medically needy—defined as
(1990)(the provision of medical benefits "to the having insufficient income or resources to meet the
medically needy by participating States is optional cost of necessary medical services-the sensible
and may be excluded entirely from a State's Medi- solution is the spend-down rule."); Hession, 516
caid program").
N.E.2d at 823 (a state's adoption of resource spend
But see Ramsey, 783 S.W.2d at 364 (court finds down "would be in conformity with the purpose and
"no authority in any category for a 'spend-down' spirit of the Act"); Kempson, 397 S.E.2d at 318
of excess resources that is similar or identical to the ("Our review of the case law reveals a pattern where
expressly authorized 'spend-down' of excess Medicaid applicants are blmdsided by this eligibility
income*); Kempson, 397 S.E.2d at 317 (court stops requirement simply because it is so illogical. Applishort of holding "resource spend down* discretio- cants who otherwise qualify are denied coverage
nary, stating that, although "§1396a(aX17)(D) only because they have several hundred dollars above the
mentions income in instructing states to provide reserve asset limit while at the same time they are
flexibility in their program application standards, we liable for tens of thousands of dollars worth of
note that §1396(a)(17)(C) instructs that a state's medical bills.")
plan must 'provide for reasonable evaluation of any
Nevertheless, a determination of the eligibility
such income or resources'")
criteria for Medicaid benefits is not one for the
12. See Utah Code Ann. §§26-18-1 to-11 courts to make.
(1989 and Supp. 1991).
13. See Utah Code Admin. P. RR455-1 to-48 BENCH, Presiding Judge (concurring in part
(1991). Utah has elected to provide assistance to the and dissenting in part):
"medically needy." See Utah Code Admin. P. R455I concur with part I of the main opinion
1-17 and R455-1-20 (1991). Assets Utah has
designated as exempt from Medicaid eligibility det- and dissent from part II.
ermination, including the burial fund discussed
Whether a "medically needy" applicant may
earlier, are listed at Utah Code Admin. P. R810- have been eligible for Medicaid by spending
304-411(1991).
down his or her assets is a policy decision
14. *[T]he Division of Health Care Financing ... delegated in Utah to DHCF by Utah Code
shall be responsible for implementing, organizing,
and maintaining the Medicaid program ... in acco- Ann. §26-18-4(1) (1989). We review for
rdance with the provisions of this chapter and app- reasonableness an agency's policy based on a
licable federal law." Utah Code Ann. § 26-18- legislative grant of discretion to interpret a
2.1 (1989Mcmphasis added); see also Utah Code statute. See Morton Int*U Inc. v. Auditing
Ann. § 26-18-3(1) (Supp. 1991)("The department Div. State Tax Comm% 814 P.2d 581 (Utah
shall be the single state agency responsible for the 1991).i
administration of the Medicaid program in connecI do not believe the policy adopted by
tion with the United States Department of Health DHCF is reasonable since eligibility is deterand Human Services pursuant to Title XIX of the
mined by when the medically needy applicant
Social Security Act.*)(emphasis added).
15. See Utah Code Admin. P. R810-304-411 applies for benefits. Under DHCF's policy,
the applicant who is savvy enough to spend
(1991).
down his or her assets before applying for
16. In fact, one commentator states:
medicaid would be eligible, while the applicant
It is not only conceivable, but a fact
who applies for benefits before spending down
that some unprepared applicants' assets
is not eligible. Because that agency policy is
are reduced beyond the poverty level to
not reasonable, I would allow Allen to spend
bankruptcy because medical bills in that
month exceed those resources which the
down his assets before his eligibility is deterapplicant cannot preserve under the
mined.
Utah Exemptions Act. It [is] to the
I would therefore reverse and remand the
applicant's advantage to put forth any
case for further proceedings.
plausible argument that a particular
Russell W. Bench, Presiding Judge
value should be counted as income
rather than asset, if the reverse would
result in excess assets. Excess assets
1. I disagree with the majority's interpretation of
mean a demal of Medicaid ehgibility;
Utah Code Ann. §26-18-2.3(1) (1989) as an
excess income means that the applicant
expression of intent to limit coverage. The Legislawill be required to shoulder more of [his
ture's concern for economy and efficiency in the ador] her health care costs for that month.
ministration of the program simply does not have
Ken Bresm, Utah*s Medicaid Program: A Senior's any logical relationship to the intended coverage of
Eligibility Guide for Private Practitioners, 14 J. the program.
Contemp. L. 1, 9 (1988) (emphasis addedXfootnote
omitted).

SOCIAL SECURITY AMENDMENTS OF 1965
For text of Act sec p. S05
House Report (Ways and Means Committee) No. 213, Mar. 29, 1965
[To accompany H.R. 6675]
Senate Report (Finance Committee) No. 404, June 30, 1965
[To accompany H.R. 6675]
Conference Report No. 682, July 26,1965 [To accompany H.R. 6675]
Cong. Record Vol. I l l (1965)
DATES OF CONSIDERATION AND PASSAGE
House Apr. 8, July 27, 1965
Senate July 9, July 28, 1965
The Senate Report and the Conference Report are set out.
SENATE REPORT NO. 404
HE Corr.:r.i::ee on Finance, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 6675'
G
to provide a hospital insurance program for the aged under the Social
Security Ac: with a supplementary health benefits program ar.d an expanded program of medical assistance, to increase benefits under the oldage, survivors, and disability insurance system, to improve the FederalState public assistance programs, and for other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with amendments and recommend
that the bi'.i dc pass.

PART I
I.

BRIEF SUMMARY

The overall purpose of H.R. 667S is as follows:
First, to provide a coordinated approach for health insurance and medical
care for the aged under the Social Security Act by establishing three new
health care programs: (1) a compulsory hospital-based program for the
aged; (2) a voluntary supplementary plan to provide physicians' and other
supplementary health services for the aged; and (3) an expanded medical
assistance program for the needy and medically needy aged, blind, disabled,
and families with dependent children.
Second, to expand the services for maternal and child health, crippled
children, child welfare, and the mentally retarded, and to establish a 5-year
program ox "special project grants" to provide comprehensive health care
and services for needy children (including those who arc emotionally disturbed) of school age or preschool age.
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6.

I M P R O V E M E N T AND E X T F X S I O X OF KERR-MILLS
MEDICAL A S S I S T A N C E PROGRAM

(a) Background
The provision of medical care for the needy has kr.g been a responsibility of the State and local public welfare agencies. In recent years,
tht Fcdtr^] Government has assisted the States and localities in carrying this responsibility by participating in the cos: of the care provided.
Ur.cer the original Social Security A.ct, it was possible for the States,
with Federal help, to furnish money to the needy with which they could
buy the medical care they needed. Since 1950, the Social Security Act
has authorized participation in the cost of medical care provided in behalf of the needy aged, blind, disabled, and dependent children—the socalled vendor payments.
5v.-vera! tiir.es since 1950, the Congress has liberalized the provisions
c: h.w under which the States administer the State-Federal program of
:r.:ical assistance for the needy. The most significant enactment was
in 1950 when the Kerr-Mills medical assistance for the aged program
v. as authorized. This legislation ofYers generous Federal matching to
v able the States t : pruvidc medical care in behalf of aged persons who
h v * enough income for their basic maintenance but not enough for
:n. heal care costs. This program has grown to the pjint where 40 States
r t d 4 other jurisdictions have such a program and over 246,000 aged
\. : r : aided in March 1955. Furthermore, medical care as a part of the
cash maintenance assistance programs has also grown through the years
r::*ii, at this time, nearly all the States make vendor payments for some
it.-r.is of medical care for at least some of the needy.
The committee bill is designed to liberalize the Federal law under which
States operate their medical assistance programs so as to make medical
services for the needy more generally available. To accomplish this objective, the committee bill would establish, effective January 1, 1966, a
new title in the Social Security Act—"Title X I X : Grants to the States
for Medical Assistance Programs."
Under the House bill, after an interim period ending June 30, 1967,
all States would have to adopt the new program or lose Federal matching
as to vendor medical payments since the current provisions of law would
expire at that time. Under the committee bill the States will have the
option of participating under the new program or continuing to operate
under the vendor payment provisions of title I (old-age assistance and
medical assistance for the aged), title IV (aid to families with dependent
children), title X (aid to the blind), title XIV (aid to the permanently
and totally disabled), and title XVI (the combined adult program). Programs of vendor payments for medical care will continue, as now, to be
optional with the States.
(b) State plan requirements
(1) Standard provisions
The provisions in the proposed title XIX contain a number of requirements for State plans which are either identical to the existing provisions of law or are merely conforming changes. These are:
That a plan shall be in effect in all political subdivisions of the
State,
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That there shall be provided an opportunity for a fair hearing for
any individual whose claim for assistance is denied or not acted
upon with reasonable promptness.
That the State agency will make such reports as the Secretary
may from time to time require.
That there shall be safeguards provided which restrict the use or
disclosure of information concerning applicants or recipients to purposes directly connected with the administration of the plan.
That all individuals wishing to make application for assistance
under the plan shall have an opportunity to do so and that such assistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness.
That in determining whether an individual is blind there shall be
an examination by a physician skilled in the diseases of the eye or
by an optometrist, whichever the individual may select.
That medical assistance will be furnished to individuals who arc
residents of the State but who are absent therefrom.
(2) Additions to standard provisions
In addition to the requirements for State plans mentioned above, the
committee bill contains several other plan requirements which are either
new or changed over provisions currently in the law.
The bill provides that there shall be financial participation by the State
equal to not less than 40 percent of the non-Federal share of the expenditures under the plan and that, effective July 1, 1970, the financial participation by the State shall equal all the non-Federal share. This provision was included to make certain that the lack of availability of local
funds for financing of any part of the program not afreet the amount,
scope, or duration of benefits or the level of administration set by the
State. Prior to the 1970 date, the committee will be willing to consider
other legislative alternatives to the provisions making the entire nonFederal share a responsibility of the State so long as these alternatives,
in maintaining the concept of local participation, assure a consistent
statewide program at a reasonable level of adequacy.
The bill contains a provision found in the other public assistance titles
of the Social Security Act that the State plan must include such methods
of administration as are found by the Secretary to be necessary for the
proper and efficient operation of the plan, with the addition of the requirement that such methods must include provisions for utilization of professional medical personnel in the administration of the plan. It is important that State utilize a sufficient number of trained and qualified personnel in the administration of the program including both medical and
other professional staff.
The committee's bill would add a requirement that the State plan include a description of the standards, methods, and administrative arrangements which affect quality of medical care that a State will use in
administering medical assistance. This amendment would give no authority to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare with respect
to the content of such standards and methods. In this respect it is somewhat analogous to the requirement, which has been in the public assistance titles since 1950 and which is included in the new title XIX, requiring States to have an authority or authorities responsible for establish-
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ing and maintaining standards for private or public institutions in \vhi<
recipients may receive care or services.
The committee also added an amendment to require that, after Jui
30, 1967, private and public medical institutions must meet standan
(which may be in addition to the standards prescribed by the State) n
lating to protection against fire and other hazards to the health and saf<
ty of individuals, which arc established by the Secretary of Health, Edt
cation, and Welfare. The committee assumes that the standards pr«
scribed by many States at the present time will meet or exceed those pre
scribed by the Secretary.
The House bill provided that the State or local agency administcrinj
the State plan under title X I X shall be the same agency which is cur
rciitly administering either title I (old-age assistance) or that part o
title XVI (assistance for the aged, blind, and the disabled, and medica
assistance for the aged) relating to the aged. Where the program relating to the aged is State supervised, the same State agency shall supervise the administration of title X I X .
The committee believes that the States should be given the opportun^
::y to select the agency they wish to administer the program. A number
of witnesses appearing before the committee have expressed the belief
that the State health agency should be given the primary responsibility
under this program. The committee bill leaves this decision wholly to
the States with the sole requirement that the determination of eligibility
for medical assistance be made by the State or local agency administering State plans approved under title I or XVI. The committee agrees
with the statement in the House report that the welfare agencies have
''long experience and skill in determination of eligibility."
The committee bill also provides that if, on January 1, 1965, and on
the date a State submits its title X I X plan, the State agency administering or supervising the administration of the State plan for the blind under title X or title XVI of the Social Security Act is different from the
State agency administering or supervising the administration of the new
program, such blind agency may be designated to administer or supervise the administration of the portion of the title XIX plan which relates to blind individuals. This would include the eligibility determining
function. In such case, the portion of the title XIX plan administered
or supervised by each agency shall be regarded as a separate plan.
Current provisions of law requiring States to have an agency or agencies responsible for establishing and maintaining standards for the types
of institutions included under the State plan have been continued under
the bill. Your committee expects that these provisions will be used to
bring about progressive improvement in the level of institutional care
and services provided to recipients of medical assistance. Standards of
care in many medical institutions are not now at a satisfactory level and
it is hoped that current standards applicable to medical institutions will
be improved by the State's standard-setting agency and that these standards will be enforced by the appropriate State body.
Under provisions of the committee bill, the State plan must include
such safeguards as may be necessary to assure that eligibility for care
and services under the plan will be determined, and that such care and
services will be provided, in a manner consistent with simplicity of ad-

2016

SOCIAL SECURITY AMENDMENTS
ministration and the best interests of the recipient. This provision was
included in order to provide some assurance that the States will not use
unduly complicated methods of determining eligibility which have the effect of delaying in an unwarranted fashion the decision on eligibility for
medical assistance or that the States will not administer the provisions
for services in a way which adversely affects the availability or the quality of the care to be provided. The committee expects that under this
provision, the States will be eliminating unrewarding and unproductive
policies and methods of investigation and that they will develop such procedures as will assure the most effective working relationships with medical facilities, practitioners, and suppliers of care and service in order to
encourage their full cooperation and participation in the provision of
services under the State plan.
The committee hopes that there will be continuing evaluation o: all State
plan requirements in relation to the basic objectives of the legislation.
(c) Eligibility for medical assistance
Under the committee bill, a State plan to be approved must include
provision : : : medical assistance for all individuals receiving ai: or assistance unler State plans approved under titles I, IV, X,'XIV, and XVI.
It is only if this group is provided for that States may inclule medical
assistance tc the less needy.
Under the committee bill, medical assistance made available to persons
receiving assistance under title I, IV, X, XIV, or XVI must net be less
in amount, duration, or scope than that provided for persons receiving aid
jnder any other of those titles. In other words, the amount, duration,
ind scope o: medical assistance made available must be the same for all
;uch persons. This will assure comparable treatment for all of the needy
lided un-rrr the federally aided categories of assistance.
The bill provides furthermore that as States extend their pr:grr.:r.s to
nclude assistance for persons who come within the various categories of
issistance except that their income and resources are sufficient to meet
heir needs for maintenance, the medical assistance given such individuals
hall not be greater in amount, duration, or scope than that mace availble for persons who are recipients of money payments. This was inluded in order to make sure that the most needy in a State receive no
?ss comprehensive care than those who are not as needy.
Under the bill, if a State extends the program to those persons not reeiving assistance under titles I, IV, X, XIV, and XVI, the determinaon of financial eligibility must be on a basis that is comparable as among
ic people who, except for their income and resources, would be recipmts of money for maintenance under the other public assistance prorams. Thus, the income and resources limitation for the aged must be
jmparable to that set for the disabled and blind and must also have a
)mpa:ability for that set for families with children who, except for
icir income and resources, would be eligible for AFDC. The scope,
nour.c, and duration of medical assistance available to each of these
•oups must be equal.
The committee has amended the House bill, however, so that this prosion as to comparability does not apply in the case of services in institions for tuberculosis or mental diseases. Federal financial participaU.S.Co^. i A;r;r\News '65—127
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t JH is authorized only \\ith respect to recipients acred 65 : 1 o\cr in
r-cntal and tubercu1osis mstitJtions so it woold not be : r : - o ; r i u t c to
-c'uee them within the scope of this pro\Mon
(d) Determination of need for medical assistance
The committee bill would make more specific a pro\ lsion now in the
\\w that in determining eligibility for and the extent of aid under the
p an, States must use reasonable standards consistent with the objectives
of the titles. Although States may set a limitation on income and resources
which indiwduals may hold and be eligible for aid, thc\ r ^ s t do so by
maintaining a comparability among the \arious categorical groups of needy
;-ople. Whatever level of financial eligibility the State determines to be
:'-at \\h ch is applicable for the eligibility of the needy agea, for example,
--?11 be comparable to that which the State sets to determine the chg'bil* for the necd\ bhnd and disabled; and must :/so ha\e a Cvmpirau'iity
*, the standards used to dcter^ ne the ergibilit} of those \ ro are to rec. \e mec cal assis*ance as n^cd) child-cn and t^e patents c c*her ^ ' a * ^ es caring for them
ViOther pioMbon is included that requires States to take ' to account
~i\ sucn income and resources as (determined :n accordance with * ^n-~z r*~cscr,bed b\ the SccrctarO, arc actualH a\aiiable to v.c arp, caT t
.,: recipient and as would not be disregarded (or set r ^ d e for :itu~e
• LCCO in determining the eligibility for and the amount of x^e ?"a or as- r*r.nce in the form of money pauiKnts for an> such ?ppl cant or rec p'ent under the title of the Social Security Act most appropriately apz. .cable to him. Income and resources taken into account, furthermore,
~ :st be reasonabl\ e\aluated by the States
These pro\ isions are des
g-cd so that the States will not assume the aAailabf.it> of income which
r">\ not, in fact be a\ailable or o\erevaluate income and resoirce* which
are a\ailable. Examples of income assumed include support orders from
« js^nt lathers, which ha\e not been paid or contributions frum re'atnes
which are not in reality recened by the needy individual.
The committee has heard of hardships on certain indiuduals by requiring them to provide support and to pay for the medical care needed
by relatives. The committee believes it is proper to expect spouses to support each other and parents to be held accountable for the support of their
minor children and their blind or permanently and totally disabled children even though 21 years of age or older. Such requirements for support may reasonably include the payment by such relative, if able, for
medical care. Beyond such degree of relationship, however, requirements
imposed are often destructive and harmful to the relationships among
members of the family group. Thus, States may not include in their
plans provisions for requiring contributions from relatives other than
a spouse or the parent of a minor child or children over 21 who arc blind
or permanently and totally disabled. Any contributions actually made
by relatives or friends, or from other sources, will be taken into account
by the State in determining whether the individual appl)ing for medical
assistance is, in fact, in need of such assistance.
The bill also contains a provision designed to correct one of the weaknesses identified in the medical assistance for the aged program. Under
the current provisions of Federal law, some States have enacted pro-
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grams which contain a cutoff point on income which determines the financial eligibility of the individual. Thus, an individual with an income
just under the specified limit may qualify for all of the aid provided under the State plan. Individuals, however, whose income exceeds the
limitation adopted by the State are found ineligible for the medical assistance provided under the State plan even though the excess of the
individual's income may be small when compared with the cost of the
medical care needed. In order that all States shall be flexible in the consideration of an individual's income, the committee bill requires that the
State's standards for determining eligibility for and extent of medical
assistance shall take into account, except to the extent prescribed by the
Secretary, the cost—whether in the form of insurance premiums or otherwise—incurred for medical care or any other type of remedial care
recognized under State law. Thus, before an individual is found ineligible for all or part of the cost of his medical needs, the State must be
sure that the income of the individual has been measured in terms of both
the State's allowance for basic maintenance needs and the cost of the
medical care he requires.
This determination must be made by the agency administering the oldage assistance or combined adult program; i.e., the welfare agency.
The State may require the use of all the excess income of the individual toward his medical expenses, or some proportion of that amount.
In no event, however, with respect to either this provision or that described below with reference to the use of deductibles for certain items
of medical service, may a State require the use of income or resources
which would bring the individual's income below the amount established
as the test of eligibility under the State plan. Such action would reduce
the individual below the level determined by the State as necessary for
his maintenance.
The bill contains several interrelated provisions which prohibit or limit
the imposition of any deduction, cost sharing, or similar charge, or of any
enrollment fee, premium, or similar charge, under the plan.
Xo deduction, cost sharing or similar charge may be imposed with respect to inpatient hospital services furnished under the plan. This provision is related to another provision in the bill which requires States
to pay reasonable costs for inpatient hospital services provided under
the plan. Taken together, these provisions give assurance that the hospital bill incurred by a needy individual shall be paid in full under the
provisions of the State plan for the number of days covered and that
States may not expect to require the individual to use his income or resources (except such income as exceeds the State's maintenance level)
toward that bill. The reasonable cost of inpatient hospital services shall
be determined in accordance with standards approved by the Secretary
and included in the State plan.
For any other items of medical assistance furnished under the plan, a
charge of any kind may be imposed only if the State so chooses, and the
charge must be reasonably related to the recipient's income or his income
and resources. The same limitations apply in the case of any enrollment
fee, premium, or similar charge imposed with respect to inpatient hospital
services. The Secretary is given authority to issue standards under this
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provision, which it is expected will protect the income and resources ;
individual has which are necessary for his nonmedical needs.
The hospital insurance benefit program included under other provisio
of the bill provides for a deductible which must be paid in connccti<
with the individual's claim for hospitalization benefits. The c:mmittee
concerned that hospitalization be readily available to needy persons ai
that the necessity of their paying deductibles or cost sharing shall not
a hardship on them or a factor which may prevent their receiving i
hospitalization they need. For this reason, the committee's ':!'.'. provid
that the States make provisions, for individuals 65 years or older wl
are included in the new plan, of the cost of any deductible or cost sharii
imposed with respect to individuals under the program established by t
hospital insurance provisions of the bill.
A State medical assistance plan may provide for the payrr.:nt in fi
of any deductibles or cost sharing under the insurance program esta
iished by part B of title XVIII. In the event, however, the S:a:e plan pr
vides for the individual to assume a portion of such costs, such porti
shall be determined on a basis reasonably related to the individual's i
come, or income and resources and in conformity with standards issu
by the Secretary. The Secretary is authorized to issue standards—unc
this provision which, it is expected, will protect the income :rd resourc
of the individual needed for his maintenance—to guide the States. Su
standards shall protect the income and resources of the individual need
for his maintenance and provide assurance that the responsibility plac
on individuals to share in the cost shall not be an undue burden on the
Titles I and XVI authorizing the medical assistance for the aged pi
gram now provide that the States may not impose a lien against t
property of any individual prior to his death on account of medical •
sistance payments except pursuant to a court judgment concerning
correct payments, and prohibit adjustment or recovery for amounts c
rectly paid except from the estate of an aged person after his death a
that of his surviving spouse. This provision, under the committee t
has been broadened so that such an adjustment or recovery would
made only at a time when there is no surviving child who is under i
age of 21 or who is blind or permanently and totally disabled.
(e) Scope and definition of medical services
"Medical assistance*' is defined under the bill to mean pa\ment of
or part of the cost of care and sen-ices for individuals who would
needy, be dependent under title IV, except for section 406(a)(2), ?
are under the age of 21, or who are relatives specified in section 4C6
(1) with whom the child is living, or who arc 65 years of age and ok
blind, or permanently and totally disabled, but whose income and
sources arc insufficient to meet all their medical care costs. The bill,
do current provisions of law, permits Federal sharing in the cost of m
ical care provided up to 3 months before the month in which the indi\
ual makes application for assistance. Thus, the scope of the progr
includes not only the aged, blind, disabled, and dependent children
defined in State plans, but also children under the age of 21 (and tl
caretaker relatives) who come within the scope of title IV, except
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TITLE XIX. GRANTS TO STATES FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS
CROSS REFERENCES
This Title is referred to in 7 USCS §§ 2026, 3178; 8 USCS § 1522: 12 USCS
§§ 1715w, 1715Z-7: 25 USCS §1622; 38 USCS §§622, 4108: -2 USCS
§§ 242b, 254a-1, 254b, 254c, 254e, 254h, 254n, 300e, 300e-6, 300m-6. 300z-5.
602, 603, 606, 614, 632a, 671, 671, 673, 705, 709, 1301, 1306, 130S, 1309,
1310, 1315, 1316, 1318, 1320a-l, 1320a-2, 1320a-3, 1320a-5, 1320a-7. 1320a7a, 1320a-8, 1320b-2, 1320b-3, 1320b-4. 1320b-5. 1320c-2, 1320c-iO, 13S2.
13822. !3S2h, 13S2i, 1383c. 1395b-l, 1395%. !395x. 1395yJ--1395z. !395cc.
1395mm. 1395H, 1395w. 1395ww. 1997. 3C:3. 3026, 3035b,""S624
§ 1396. Appropriations
For the purpose of enabling each State. 2S far as practicable under the
conditions in such State, to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of
families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of
necessary medical services, and (2) rehabilitation and other services to help
such families and individuals attain or retain capability for independence or
self-care, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year
a sum sufficient to carry out the purposes of this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et
seq.]. The sums made available under this section shall be used for making
payments to States which have submitted, and had approved by the
Secretary, State plans for medical assistance.
(Aug. 14, 1935, ch 531, Title XIX, § 1901, as added July 30, i965, P. L.
89-97, Title I, Part 2, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 343: Dec. 31, 1973, P. L. 93-233,
§ 13(a)(1), 87 Stat. 960; July 18, 1984, P. L. 98-369, Division B. Title VI.
Subtitle D, § 2663(j)(3)(C), 98 Stat. 1171.)
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(17) include reasonable standards (which shall be comparable for all
groups and may, in accordance with standards prescribed by the
Secretary, differ with respect to income levels, but only in the case of
applicants or recipients of assistance under the plan who are not
receiving aid or assistance under anv plan of the State approved under
title I. X, XIV, or XVI. or part A of'title IV [-2 USCS §§ 301 et seq.,
1201 et seq., 1351 et seq., 13S1 et seq.. 601 et seq.], and with respect to
whom supplemental security income benefits are not being paid under
title XVI [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.]. based on the variations between
shelter costs in urban areas and in rural areas) for determining eligibility
for and the extent of medical assistance under the plan which (A) are
consistent with the objectives o\ this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.], (B)
provide for taking into account only such income and resources as are,
as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary,
available to the applicant or recipient and (in the case ot any applicant
or recipient who would, except for income and resources, be eligible for
aid or assistance in the form of money payments under any plan of the
State approved under title I, X, XIV, or XVI, or part A of title IV [42
USCS §§ 301 et seq., 1201 et seq., 1351 et seq., 1381 et seq., 601 et seq.],
or to have paid with respect to him supplemental security income
benefits under title XVI [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.]) as would not be
disregarded (or set aside for future needs) in determining his eligibility
for such aid, assistance, or benefits, (C) provide for reasonable evaluation of any such income or resources, and (D) do not take into account
the financial responsibility of any individual for any applicant or
recipient of assistance under the plan unless such applicant or recipient
is such individual's spouse or such individual's child who is under 21 or
661
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(with respect to States eligible to participate in the State program
established under title XVI [42 USCS §§1381 et seq.]), is blind or
permanently and totally disabled, or is blind or disabled as defined in
section 1614 [42 USCS § 1382c] (with respect to States which are not
eligible to participate in such program); and provide for flexibility in the
application of such standards with respect to income by taking into
account, except to the extent prescribed by the Secretary, the costs
(whether in the form of insurance premiums or otherwise) incurred for
medical care or for any other type of remedial care recognized under
State law;
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(17) except as provided in subsections (1X3). and (mX4)[J include reasonable standards (which shall
be comparable for all groups and may, in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary,
difier with respect to income levels, but only in the case of applicants or recipients of assistance under
the plan who are not receiving aid or assistance under any plan of the State approved under title I,
X, XIV, or XVI, or part A of title IV [42 USCS §§ 301 et seq., 1201 et seq., 1351 et seq., 1381 et
seq., 601 et seq.], and with respect to whom supplemental security inoome benefits are not being paid
under title XVI (42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.], based on the variations between shelter costs in urban,
areas and in rural areas) for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance under the
plan which (A) are consistent with the objectives of this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.). (B) provide
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for Uking into account only such income and resources as are, as determined in accord
standards prescribed by the Secretary, available to the applicant or recipient and (in the a
applicant or recipient who would, except for income and resources, be eligible for aid or ass
the form of money payments under any plan of the State approved under title I, X XIV, o
part A of title IV [42 USCS §§ 301 et seq.( 1201 et seq., 1351 et seq.t 1381 et seq., 601 ct $
have paid with respect to him supplemental security income benefits under title XVI |
§§ 1381 et seq.]) as would not be disregarded (or set aside for future needs) in dctern
eligibility for such aid, assistance, or benefits, ( Q provide for reasonable evaluation of
income or resources, and (D) do not take into account the financial responsibility of any
for any applicant or recipient of assistance under the plan unless such applicant or recipie
individual's spouse or such individual's child who is under 21 or (with respect to States
participate in the State program established under title XVI [42 USCS §§1381 et seq.]),
permanently and totally disabled, or is blind or disabled as defined in section 1614 [42 USC
(with respect to States which are not eligible to participate in such program); and p
flexibility in the application of such standards with respect to income by uking into accot
to the extent prescribed by the Secreury, the costs (whether in the form of insurance
payments made to the Sute under section 1903(f)(2)(B) [42 USCS § 1396b(0(2)(B)]. or oth
regardless of whether such costs are reimbursed under another public program of th
political subdivision thereof) incurred for medical care or for any other type of ren
recognized under Sute law;
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